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This study explores whether security analysts recognize firms’ going-concern problems 
and report appropriately to investors. We find that analysts signal their anticipation of the 
publication  of  a  going-concern  modified  (GCM)  audit  report  in  two  ways:  1)  they 
downgrade  more  aggressively  stock  recommendations  of  GCM  firms  than  stock 
recommendations of control firms as the event date approaches; 2) they are more likely to 
cease coverage of a GCM firm than a control firm over the one-year period prior to the 
GCM date. We further show that analysts react to the publication of an actual GCM audit 
report by stopping coverage of such firms immediately subsequent to the event disclosure. 
Our  results  suggest  that  analysts  know  that  the  future  viability  of  GCM  firms  is 
jeopardized but do not say it clearly to retail investors, who constitute the main clientele of 
these  firms.  Consistent  with  the  SEC  concerns  about  analyst  recommendations,  we 
conclude  that  investors  cannot  rely  solely  on  analyst  recommendations  since  they  are 
reluctant to report negatively (i.e, “underperform” or “sell”) even in this extreme bad news 
domain. We further conclude that analyst relative pessimism and coverage cessation is 
likely to be associated with negative expectations about firms’ future prospects. 
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This  paper  explores  whether  security  analysts  anticipate  a  going-concern  audit 
opinion and report appropriately to investors on such financially distressed firms. This 
issue  is  of  significant  interest  given  the  implications  of  the  questioning  of  the  going-
concern  assumption  for  the  future  viability  of  the  firm,  and  therefore  constitutes  an 
extreme bad news signal to investors. This is further emphasized by the highly negative 
returns earned by such firms (Kausar et al., 2009).  
The main clientele for such small speculative firm stocks consists of unsophisticated 
investors (Kausar et al., 2009) who primarily rely on the analyst, and, in particular, their 
stock  recommendations  for  investment  advice,  in  contrast  to  sophisticated  investors 
(Malmendier and Shantikumar, 2007). Analyst privileged access to information may lead 
us to believe that their advice is crucial to retail investors since these more naïve investors 
are not able to produce their own predictions (De Bondt and Thaler, 1990) and because 
they may lack the time, skill or resources to analyze and interpret financial statements 
(Beaver, 2002). However, analysts have come under fire from investors, politicians and 
regulators  over  recent  years  as  a  consequence  of  their  biased  behavior.  As  such, 
investigating  whether  analysts  report  appropriately  in  the  going-concern  domain  is 
particularly important to understand if these sophisticated agents provide retail investors 
with value-relevant information in this context.  
There is an extensive literature suggesting analysts are both prone to bias in their 
judgments and reluctant to report unfavorably on firms. For instance, research shows that 
the number of “buy” recommendations is systematically higher than the number of “sell” 
recommendations (e.g., Womack, 1996; Ho and Harris, 1998; Barber et al., 2006).
1 There 
is also empirical support that analysts are self -selective by start covering firms they view 
favourably and stop covering firms   they  view  unfavourably  (McNichols  and  O’Brien, 
1997). We examine whether such behavior is equally manifest in the case of going-concern 
uncertainties where the key role played by the analyst is particularly pronounced. This 
                                                           
1 In one of the recent financial scandals, the Enron case revealed that almost 90% of analysts covering the firm were still 
recommending the firm’s stock as a “buy” or “strong buy” just six weeks before its bankruptcy filing. - 4 - 
paper sets out explicitly to answer four main questions. First, we test whether security 
analysts  anticipate the  GCM  audit report  by:  1) investigating  if  they  downgrade  more 
aggressively their stock recommendations for GCM firms in comparison to similar non-
GCM firms within the pre-GCM period; 2) investigating if analysts are more likely to 
cease coverage of GCM firms than similar non-GCM firms within the pre-GCM period. 
Second, we explore how security analysts react to the publication of a GCM audit report 
by: 1) comparing their stock recommendations for GCM firms between the pre- and post-
GCM  period;  2)  testing  if  security  analyst  interest  in  these  firms  remains  after  the 
announcement of such acute bad news. 
We find that sell-side analysts recognize the financial deterioration of firms  that 
subsequently receive a GCM audit report. However, and more importantly, analysts do not 
say what retail investors need to hear to react negatively. Our results show that analysts 
anticipate the publication of a GCM audit report by downgrading more aggressively stock 
recommendations of GCM firms (from “buy” to “hold”) when compared to similar non-
GCM firms (do not change from “buy”) as the event date approaches. In addition, analysts 
are more prone to cease coverage of GCM firms than control firms over the one-year pre-
GCM period. These results show that analysts are not interested to report negatively on 
GCM firms and do not say “underperform” or “sell”, which are the recommendations that 
retail investors recognize as unfavorable. In fact,  Malmendier and Shantikumar (2007) 
show that retail investors follow recommendations literally and, contrary to large investors, 
do not react negatively to “hold” recommendations. We also find that analyst react to the 
publication of a GCM audit report by ceasing the coverage of the stock and do not change 
significantly their recommendations from previous “hold” following the publication of the 
audit report. We conclude that analysts know that the future viability of these firms is 
jeopardized but do not say it clearly to retail investors. 
The going-concern principle is one of the most important accounting assumptions in 
the preparation of financial statements. This principle assumes that a company is ordinarily 
viewed  as  continuing  in  business  for  the  foreseeable  future.  When  this  assumption  is 
explicitly questioned by external auditors, this is perceived as an acute and unambiguous 
case of bad news (e.g., Fleak and Wilson, 1994; Carlson, Glezen, and Benefield, 1998; 
Taffler, Lu, and Kausar, 2004; Kausar, Taffler, and Tan, 2009). The GCM event offers a 
unique scenario to investigate analyst ability to anticipate bad news announcements since: 
1) going-concern qualifications tend to follow a series of unfavourable economic events, 
such as sales declines, failures to make payments on debt, dividend reductions, production 
problems, lost contracts and quarterly losses (Elliot, 1982); 2) there is evidence that the - 5 - 
GCM audit opinion can be predicted, to some extent, using accounting information (e.g., 
Mutchler, 1985; Dopuch, Holthause, and Leftwich, 1987). 
One  of  the  most  interesting  research  agendas  in  this  domain  is  to  explore  how 
analysts deal with the going-concern assumption. Two important ideas contribute to the 
interest  of  this  research  question.  First,  the  marginal  contribution  of  analysts  may  be 
greater in the dissemination of bad news to investors given the distinct incentives that 
managers  have  to  disclose  information  conditional  on  its'  nature  (Kothari,  Shu  and 
Wysocki, 2010). As Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) argue, managers of firms sitting on good 
news will push the news out the door themselves. For the opposite reason, managers will 
have few incentives to bring investors up to date quickly when firms are sitting on bad 
news. Second, the literature suggests that investors are significantly more inefficient in 
dealing with bad news in comparison to good news (e.g., Bernard and Thomas, 1989; 
Womack, 1996; Dichev and Piotroski, 2001; Kausar, Taffler, and Tan, 2009). For instance, 
Kausar, Taffler, and Tan (2009) show that the market underreacts to the publication of a 
going-concern audit report (bad news) whereas fully anticipating the withdrawal of such a 
report  (good  news).  Understanding  how  security  analysts  deal  with  the  going-concern 
principle can help us answer the question of whether the inefficient processing of negative 
information is an exclusive phenomenon of non-sophisticated agents. 
Our study also contributes to understand some unclear issues. First, there is mixed 
evidence about the ability of analysts to anticipate bad news. On the one hand, studies 
suggest  that  analysts  fail  to  anticipate  earnings  declines  associated  with  high  accruals 
(Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan, 2001; Teoh and Wong, 2002; Barth and Hutton, 2004) 
and firm restatements and corrective disclosures (Griffin, 2003). On the other hand, there 
is  evidence  that  analysts  are  able  to  anticipate  some  types  of  accounting  fraud  (e.g., 
Dechow,  Sloan,  and  Sweeney,  1996;  Cotter  and  Young,  2007)  and  bankruptcy 
announcements (Clarke, et al., 2006). Second, security analysts have long been seen as 
sophisticated processors of financial information who are less likely to misunderstand the 
implication of such information when compared to naïve investors (Ramnath, Rock, and 
Shane, 2008). However, there is evidence that analysts activity is biased, a phenomenon 
that is particularly evident in the bad news domain (e.g., Das, 1998; Easterwood and Nutt, 
1999; Brown, 2001, Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003). Third, regulators are focusing their 
attention  in  the  behavior  of  sophisticated  agents  that  play  an  important  role  in  the 
functioning of financial markets. In one of their online publications aiming at protecting 
investors, the SEC is particularly clear when discussing analyst stock recommendations:
2  
                                                           
2 See http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/analysts.htm for details. - 6 - 
“We  advise  all  investors  to  do  their  homework  before  investing.  If  you 
purchase a security solely because analyst said the company was one of his 
or her „stock picks‟, you may be doing yourself a disservice. Especially if the 
company is one you‟ve never heard of (…) Above all, remember that even 
the soundest recommendation from the most trust-worthy analyst may not be 
a good choice for you. That‟s one reason we caution investors never to rely 
solely on analyst‟s recommendations when buying or selling a stock.” 
 
Our  research  contributes  to  both  the  academic  literature  and  to  investor 
understanding. From an academic perspective, we link two areas of the accounting and 
finance literature that have been developing separately so far. By connecting the going-
concern disclosure event with analyst behaviour, we provide original evidence about how 
security analysts deal with a major bad news accounting event. From an investor vantage 
point, this study provides additional evidence on the usefulness and limitations of analysts’ 
activities.  
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: section 2 describes the sample 
selection  process  and  provides  the  descriptive  statistics  for  our  sample  and  section  3 
describes our method. Section 4 reports the results of our analyses and section 5 presents 
additional robustness checks. Section 6 discusses our results and section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Data and descriptives 
2.1.  Sample selection 
Our sample consists of 924 non-finance, non-utility, industry firm-year observations 
with first-time going-concern modified audit reports published between 01.01.1994 and 
31.12.2005 with stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ and with sufficient data 
on COMPUSTAT for our purposes.
3 The use of an unbiased GCM sample is particularly 
important for two main reasons. First, identi fying a first-time GCM company is not a 
straightforward process since existing sources of data are  not clean (e.g., Butler, Leone, 
and Willenborg, 2004; Kausar, Taffler, and Tan,  2009). Second, there is evidence that 
conflicting results in some of the goin g-concern literature are due to the use of biased 
samples (e.g., Asare, 1990; Kausar, Taffler, and Tan,  2009).  Table 1 summarizes our  
                                                           
3 These 924 cases represent 871 companies. - 7 - 
sample construction process. It draws heavily on Kausar, Taffler, and Tan (2009) and is 
designed to eliminate the number of incorrect cases classified as GCM firms. 
We start by using 10k Wizard’s free text search tool to explore the information on 
the EDGAR database and identify firms with going-concern modified audit reports from 
1994 to 2005. The combination of keywords used as search strings are “raise substantial 
doubt” and “ability to continue as a going concern”. This search identifies 29,102 audit 
reports  from  which  we  exclude  16,866  cases  because  firms  are  not  found  in  the 
CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged file. Following recent studies addressing GCM companies 
(e.g.,  Ogneva  and  Subramanyam,  2007;  Kausar,  Taffler,  and  Tan,  2009),  we  work 
exclusively with first-time GCM cases. In particular, we define a GCM audit report as 
first-time if a firm has not received a GCM opinion in the previous fiscal year. The use of 
first-time  GCM  cases  is  justified  by  the  evidence  that  the  informational  value  of  a 
continuing going-concern report is less clear than that of a first-time report (Mutchler, 
Hopwood, and McKeown, 1997) and that a company with a going-concern qualification in 
a given year is more likely to receive a qualification the next year (Mutchler, 1985). From 
the 2,296 remaining cases, we delete another 1,017 since there is insufficient accounting or 
market data for our purposes in the COMPUSTAT or CRSP databases. In particular, we 
exclude: 1) companies not listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ during the 12-
months pre-GCM date; 2) companies not trading ordinary common stock; 3) companies 
with unavailable accounting information for the 2-year period before the GCM year. 
Finally, we delete cases that could potentially bias our results due to their specific 
characteristics.  In  particular,  we  remove:  1)  companies  classified  as  “utilities”  or 
“financials”  according  to  the  49  industry  portfolios  defined  by  Kenneth  French;
4  2) 
companies classified as foreign to ensu re a consistent legal framework; 3)  companies 
classified as in a “development stage” since these companies have unique characteristics 
and have a considerable chance of failure;
5 4) companies that file Chapter 11 before the 
audit report publication date since this filing contaminates the impact of a first-time GCM 
audit report on market prices. 
 
 
Table 1 here 
 
 
                                                           
4 This is because “utility” firms are affected by specific regulations and “financial” firms accounting information is not 
comparable to that of the remaining firms respectively. 
5 The Statements of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) define a “development stage enterprise” as a company that: 1) 
devotes substantially all its efforts to establishing a new business and has not begun planned operations or 2) has begun 
operations, but has not generated significant revenue. - 8 - 
2.2.  Control firm selection 
Investigating  how  security  analysts  deal  with  the  GCM  audit  report  by  solely 
studying GCM firm cases might introduce a selection bias since analysts cannot know ex-
ante which firms will receive a GCM audit report. Drawing on Clarke et al. (2006), we 
mitigate  this  problem  by  comparing  analyst  stock  recommendations  across  GCM  and 
similar  non-GCM  firms.  As  Clarke  et  al.  (2006)  argue,  “This  comparison  of 
recommendations for sample firms against their matched firm counterparts allows us to 
control any possible selection bias and permits useful conclusions regarding the nature of 
analyst recommendations for financially distressed firms”. 
In our main results, our set of control firms consists of non-GCM firms with similar 
size and BM ratio to those of our sample firms. This is because size and BM ratio may 
drive analyst preference for specific firms. For instance, these two characteristics  have 
demonstrated ability to predict stock prices. Size is one of the most important variables 
associated  with  stock  returns  (e.g.,  Banz,  1981;  Keim,  1983,  Fama  and  French,  1992; 
Lakonishok,  Shleifer,  and  Vishny,  1994).  Generally,  research  suggests  that  small  firm 
stocks  experience  different  returns  from  large  firm  stocks,  a  phenomenon  that  is 
particularly important in our setting. BM ratio has also demonstrated ability to predict 
stock returns. For instance, Fama and French (1992) find a significant positive correlation 
between  the  expected  return  of  a  firm  and  its  BM  ratio.  These  findings  are  further 
supported by Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein (1985) and Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1994). In this context, “analysts may be explicitly or intuitively aware of the ability of 
these  variables  to  predict  future  returns.  If  so,  we  would  expect  the  variables  to  be 
correlated with analyst recommendations in the same way they are correlated with future 
returns” (Jegadeesh et al., 2004). In addition, the literature suggests that analyst coverage 
is strongly correlated with firm size (e.g., Bhushan, 1989; Hong, Lim, and Stein, 2000) and 
shows that analysts tend to favour “growth” stocks compared to “value” stocks (Jegadeesh 
et al., 2004), highlighting the need to control our results for these two characteristics. 
We identify 924 non-GCM control firms by matching each of our sample firms with 
the company with most similar size and BM ratio. The matching process is as follows. 
First, for each sample firm, we identify all non-financial, non-utility and non-GCM firms 
listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ at the GCM announcement date. Sample and 
match candidate size is defined as market capitalization (shares outstanding times price) 
one year before the GCM announcement.
6 Subsequently, among the match candidates for 
each sample firm, we identify those with a market value between 70% and 130% of the 
                                                           
6 We also measure the market value for sample and control firms six and one month before the GCM announcement date to 
ensure the robustness of our results. Results are materially the same. - 9 - 
sample firm. Finally, from this list of candidates, we choose as a control firm the firm 
which has the closest BM ratio to that of our GCM firm.
7 BM ratio is defined as the book 
value of equity divided by market capitalization. Book value of equity is taken from the 
last annual accounts reported before the measurement of market capitalization. 
 
2.3.  Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 provides sample firms descriptive statistics. Panel A of table 2 shows the 
annual distribution of the GCM cases and reveals that the annual number of first-time 
GCM audit reports disclosed is, for most of the years, between 60 and 100 cases. The 
exceptions are the years of 1994, 1995, 2004 and 2005, for which the number of cases is 
below 60 and the years of 2001 and 2002 for which the number of cases is above 100. 
Panel B of table 2 shows that our sample is typically composed of small companies 
with  high  distress  risk.  For  instance,  our  sample  firms  have  low  market  capitalization 
(mean  size  =  $89.6m;  median  size  =  $33.6m),  low  net  sales  (mean  sales  =  $103.7m; 
median sales = $21.55m) and low total assets (mean total assets = $120.7m; median total 
assets = $25.34m). Not surprisingly, we find that our sample firms are highly financially 
distressed. In particular, the firms are highly loss making (mean return on assets = -63%; 
median return on assets = -37%), have low ability to meet short-term debt obligations 
(mean current ratio = 1.72; median current ratio = 1.16), and are highly leveraged (mean 
leverage ratio = 38%; median leverage ratio = 32%). The mean (median) Altman (1968) z-
score  is  1.15  (0.93),  well  below the reference cut-off  score  of 1.81, indicating  a  high 
probability of failure within the next year. In addition, the mean (median) score of the 
discriminant  model  that  predicts  a  forthcoming  GCM  audit  report  (PREDGC)  is  0.20 
(0.01), suggesting that our sample firms are close to the cut off score of 0.01 that we use to 
distinguish “expected” from “unexpected” GCM audit reports.
8 Panel B of table 2 also 
indicates that book value per share of sample firms is low relative to the stock price (mean 
BM ratio = 0.77; median BM ratio = 0.40) and that stock firms have experienced negative 
returns over the previous 11 -months prior to the GCM announcement (mean  monthly 
momentum [t=-12 to -2] = -4%; median momentum = -4%).  
                                                           
7 Fama and French (1992, 1993) argue that it is important to ensure that accounting variables are known before the market 
variables they are paired to. As such, the book-value of equity is that taken from the last annual accounts reported before the 
date used to calculate the market value of equity. 
8 The probability of a GCM audit report (PREDGC) is based on the multiple discriminant model used by Mutchler (1985), 
Fleak and Wilson (1994) and Blay and Geiger (2001). The discriminant model typically minimizes the classification error 
based on an auditor’s decision of issuing/not issuing a GCM audit report. However, since we work exclusively with GCM 
firms, we follow Blay and Geiger (2001) and use Fleak’s and Wilson (1994) minimum cut off score of 0.01 to distinguish 
“expected” from “unexpected” reports. - 10 - 
Panel C of table 2 reveals that although 85% of our GCM firms have positive book 
value  of  equity  only  8%  of  them  report  positive  earnings  in  the  year  preceding  the 
publication of a GCM audit report and that only 2.5% pay dividends. The data analysis 
also reveals that almost 5% of our sample firms enter into bankruptcy/liquidation (delisting 
codes: 400, 572, 574) within the one-year period subsequent to the GCM announcement 
date, but, importantly, no less than 46% of our sample firms are delisted within the same 
period. On the other hand, almost one in five firms continue to be listed and appear to 
recover in the following fiscal year with their GCM lifted. Finally, two thirds of firms are 
audited by the one of the five audit companies that dominate the supply of audit services 
worldwide (BIG5).  
 
 
Table 2 here 
 
 
Table 3 compares the descriptive statistics between our 924 GCM firms and their 
control  firms.  As expected,  there  are no significant  differences  between  the mean  and 
median size and BM ratio, which are the criteria used to match each GCM firm. However, 
there are significant differences in the other variables presented in table 3. For instance, 
GCM firms have a significant more negative return on assets (mean ROAGCM=-0.63; mean 
ROACONTROL=-0.17,  p<0.0001  and  median  ROAGCM=-0.37;  median  ROACONTROL=-0.01, 
p<0.0001). Not surprisingly, GCM firms are associated with greater bankruptcy risk (mean 
ZSCOREGCM=1.15;  mean  ZSCORECONTROL=1.52,  p<0.0001  and  median 
ZSCOREGCM=0.93; median ZSCORECONTROL=1.22, p<0.0001) and greater ex-ante GCM 
probability (mean PREDGCGCM=0.20; mean PREDGCCONTROL=2.08, p<0.0001 and median 
PREDGCGCM=0.01;  median  PREDGCCONTROL=0.57,  p<0.0001).  Importantly,  our  GCM 
firms  have  significantly  more  negative  past  raw  returns  than  control  firms  (mean 
MOMGCM=-0.04;  mean  MOMCONTROL=0.02,  p<0.0001  and  median  MOMGCM=-0.04; 
median  MOMCONTROL=0.01,  p<0.0001).  These  results  show  that  our  GCM  firms  are 
associated with higher levels of financial distress and have worse past return performance, 
highlighting the need to control our results for these variables. 
 
 
Table 3 here 
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3. Method 
3.1.  Testing analyst anticipation and reaction to the GCM audit report 
The overarching research question of this study is whether analysts are providing 
investors with value-relevant information in the GCM domain. Specifically, we investigate 
analyst anticipation and reaction to the GCM audit report using one of their most important 
information  transmission  vehicles:  analysts’  recommendations.  The  use  of 
recommendations to address our research questions can be justified in a number of ways. 
First, they represent a clear and unequivocal course of action to investors (Elton, Gruber, 
and Grossman, 1986). Second, recommendations are viewed as the bottom line of the 
research report (e.g., Shipper, 1991). Finally, recommendations are reported on a simple 
and finite scale common to all stocks, avoiding ambiguous interpretations of information 
(McNichols and O’Brien, 1997). As Jegadeesh et al. (2004) highlight, “recommendations 
offer a unique opportunity to study analyst judgment and preferences across large samples 
of stocks”. 
Stock recommendations are obtained from the Institutional Broker Estimates System 
(I/B/E/S) database.
9 For each stock recommendation, we gather the following information: 
recommendation  date;  broker  i dentification;  analyst  identification  and  I/B/E/S 
recommendation code.  Next, following Zhang (2008), we exclude all recommendations 
issued before 01.01.1994 and after 31.12.2005 and observations with zero analyst-specific 
identification code.
10 All recommendations are then sorted by date relative to the GCM 
announcement day (t=0) and allocated in event -quarters.  Event-quarters are defined as 
periods of 90 calendar days relative to the GCM announcement date.
11 It should be noted 
that  we   follow  the  I/B/E/S  reco mmendations  ranking  scheme,  which  codes 
recommendations on a five -point  scale:  (1)  “strong  buy”;  (2)  “buy”;  (3)  “hold”;  (4) 
“underperform”; (5) “sell”. Because I/B/E/S codes “strong buy” recommendations as 1 and 
“sell” as 5, more optimistic recommendations have lower numerical values. Our final data 
consists  of  3,395 recommendations issued by  1,289  different security  analysts  for  463 
sample firms between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005 from event-quarter -8 to event quarter 
+4. 
 
                                                           
9 The I/B/E/S Recommendations database starts in October 1993 and contains, among other information, recommendations 
from a wide range of brokerage firms. 
10  I/B/E/S assigns a zero identification code if the broker did not provide an analyst name   to be associated with the 
recommendation. 
11 For example, event-quarter -1 is the period between the calendar day -1 and calendar day -90 relative to the GCM date and 
event-quarter -2 is the period between the calendar day -91 and calendar day -180 relative to the GCM date. - 12 - 
3.1.1.  Testing analyst anticipation of a GCM audit report 
We  investigate  analyst  anticipation  of  a  GCM  audit  report  within  the  pre-GCM 
period by testing: 1) if they downgrade more aggressively their stock recommendations for 
GCM firms in comparison to similar non-GCM firms; 2) if they are more likely to cease  
coverage of GCM firms than similar non-GCM firms. As such, we focus on two different 
signals that analysts might use to communicate unfavourable information about a firm 
before  the  publication  of  a  GCM  audit  report:  1)  analyst  downgrade  of  stock 
recommendations;  and  2)  analyst  cessation  of  stock  coverage.  If  the  first  message  is 
intuitively understood as negative information, the second one requires more discussion. 
The  association  between  analyst  decision  to  cease  coverage  of  a  firm  and  negative 
information is justified by the evidence that analysts are reluctant to issue unfavourable 
investment advice (McNichols and O’Brien, 1997) and that they generally remain at the 
same brokerage firm after stopping firm coverage (Clarke et al., 2006). 
We  conduct  two  different  tests  to  investigate  analyst  downgrade  of  stock 
recommendations and analyst coverage cessation. In the first case, we test the significance 
of the differences in analyst mean and median recommendations and percentage of “buy” 
recommendations over the 8 event-quarters prior to the GCM date between sample and 
control  firms  using  the  two-tailed  t-test,  the  Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney  test  and  the 
binomial test, respectively. Secondly, we test if analysts are more likely to cease coverage 
of a GCM firm than a similar non-GCM firm using a binary logistic regression model 








   (1) 
 
where Pr(CEASEi =1) is the probability of analyst i ceasing coverage of firm j from 
event-quarter -4 to event-quarter -1 and z represents a vector of  explanatory variables, 
defined as follows: 
 
9
i 0 n ni i
n1
z X u 





We employ 9 independent variables to estimate equation 2, all of which are expected 
to be related to the probability of analyst coverage cessation. The variables are as follows: - 13 - 
1.  Going-concern modified group (GCMG): This is the key independent variable 
and is defined as a binary variable that equals 1 when the company receives a 
first-time GCM audit report, 0 otherwise. As such, observations for our sample 
firms assume 1 whereas observations for control firms sharing similar size and 
BM ratio assume 0. A positive (negative) and significant coefficient suggests 
that analysts are more (less) likely to cease coverage of a GCM firm than a 
control firm; 
2.  Market  capitalization  (LOGSIZE):  This  explanatory  variable  proxies  for  the 
information environment and is defined as the natural log of the firms’ market 
value computed as shares outstanding times price one year before the GCM 
announcement. Given that analysts tend to follow larger firms (e.g., Bhushan, 
1989; Hong, Lim, and Stein, 2000), we expect that they are more likely to cease 
coverage of small firms than large firms; 
3.  Number of analysts following the firm (ANALY): This variable, directly related 
to  the  analyst  information  environment,  is  used  as  proxy  for  the  level  of 
information available about a firm (e.g., Hong, Lim, and Stein, 2000; Jiang, Lee, 
and Zhang, 2005; Zhang, 2006). Specifically, we define ANALY as the number 
of  analysts  following  the  firm  at  the  end  of  event-quarter  -4.  Similarly  to 
LOGSIZE,  we  expect  analysts  to  be  more  likely  to  cease  coverage  of  firms 
associated  with  higher  levels  of  information  uncertainty  (lower  number  of 
analysts  following)  than  firms  associated  with  lower  levels  of  information 
uncertainty  (higher number of analysts following); 
4.  Book-to-market ratio (BM): This explanatory variable is used as proxy for the 
market’s expectations about the firm’s future prospects and it is defined as in 
section 2.2. The inclusion of this variable is justified by the relationship between 
BM ratio, stock returns and analyst preferences (e.g., Fama and French, 1992; 
Jegadeesh  et  al.,  2004).  Considering  that  analysts  prefer  growth  stocks,  we 
expect that they are more likely to cease coverage of GCM stocks with high BM 
ratios (value stocks) than stocks with low BM ratios (growth stocks); 
5.  Momentum  (MOM):  This  independent  variable  proxies  for  pre-event  stock 
performance and is defined as the average monthly raw returns for the prior 11-
month  period  (t-12  to  t-2)  relative  to  the  GCM  announcement  month.  The 
inclusion of this variable is justified by the evidence that analysts prefer firms 
associated  with  positive  momentum  (Jegadeesh  et  al.,  2004).  As  such,  we - 14 - 
conjecture analysts to be more likely to cease coverage of stocks with negative 
momentum than stocks with positive momentum; 
6.  Return on assets ratio (ROA): this variable is used as a proxy for firm economic 
performance and is computed as the ratio of net income to the value of total 
assets using data from the last annual financial accounts reported before the 
GCM date. Given the evidence that analysts are self-selective (e.g., McNichols 
and O’Brien, 1997; Das, Guo, and Zhang, 2006), we assume that they are more 
likely to cease coverage of firm stocks with lower profitability than firm stocks 
with higher profitability; 
7.  Altman’s  (1968)  z-score  (ZSCORE):  This  independent  variable  proxies  for 
bankruptcy risk and is computed as in Altman (1968) using data from the last 
annual financial accounts reported before the GCM date. Considering that firms 
with high distress risk tend to underperform firms with low distress risk (e.g., 
Dichev, 1998; Griffin and Lemmon, 2002), we expect that analysts are more 
likely to cease coverage of stocks with low z-scores (more distressed firms) than 
stocks with higher z-scores (less distressed stocks); 
8.  Probability of a GCM audit report (PREDGC): This variable proxies for the ex-
ante probability of a GCM disclosure using accounting information from the last 
annual financial accounts reported before the GCM date as in Mutchler (1985). 
We expect that analysts are more likely to cease coverage of stocks with low 
PREDGC scores (more likely to receive a GCM audit report) than stocks with 
higher PREDGC scores (less likely to receive a GCM audit report); 
9.  Leverage (LEV): This proxy controls for default risk and is defined as total debt 
to total assets using data from the last annual financial accounts reported before 
the  GCM  date.  Again,  we  expect that  analysts  will  be  more  likely  to  cease 
coverage of stocks with higher LEV ratios (higher distress risk) than stocks with 
low LEV ratios (lower distress risk); 
 
Table  4  provides  the  correlation  between  all  variables.  As  can  be  seen,  for  the 
majority  of  cases,  the  correlation  between  independent  variables  is  lower  than  20% 
suggesting that these variables are not strongly correlated. There are some exceptions like 
LOGSIZE and ANALY which is consistent with the idea that analysts prefer larger firms 
(e.g., Bhushan , 1989; Hong, Lim and Stein, 2000). Moreover, there is also a considerable 
degree of association between ZSCORE, PREDGC and LEV as well as between GCMG - 15 - 
and  some  other  firm  characteristics.  In  order  to  ensure  that  our  conclusions  are  not 
contaminated by high correlations between independent variables, we estimate different 
regressions excluding those that could potentially affect the results. 
 
 




3.1.2.  Testing analyst reaction to the GCM audit report 
We investigate analyst reaction to the GCM audit report by testing: 1) if there are 
significant  differences  between  pre-  and  post-GCM  stock  recommendations  for  GCM 
firms; 2) if analyst interest in these firms remains after the announcement of such acute bad 
news.  More  specifically,  we  investigate  analyst  reaction  to  the  GCM  audit  report  by 
comparing their recommendations for GCM firms between event-quarter -1 and event-
quarter +1. We focus our attention on a short period surrounding the GCM announcement 
date since analyst reaction (if any) should occur as soon as the event becomes publicly 
known.
12  We  test  the  significance  of  the  difference   in  analyst  mean  and  median 
recommendations  and  percentage  of  “buy”  recommendations  for  GCM  firms  between 
event-quarter  -1  and  event-quarter  +1  using  the  two-tailed  t-test,  the  Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test and the binomial test, respectively. We also use a binary logistic regression 
model  to  investigate  to  what  extent,  following  the  disclosure  of  a  GCM  audit  report, 
analysts are more likely to cease coverage of a GCM firm than a similar non-GCM. The 








   (3) 
 
where Pr(CEASEi =1) is the probability of analyst i ceasing coverage of firm j’s 
from  event-quarter  -1  to  event-quarter  +1  and  w  represents  a  vector  of  independent 
variables defined as follows: 
                                                           
12 We use one event-quarter following the disclosure of a GCM audit report as reaction period to allow a reasonable number 
of observations. - 16 - 
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Equation 4 uses 8 of the same 9 explanatory variables defined in equation 2: GCMG, 
LOGSIZE, BM, MOM, ROA, ZSCORE, PREDGC and LEV together with ANALY defined 
slightly  differently.  In  particular,  ANALY  is  now  defined  as  the  number  of  analysts 
following the company at the end of the event-quarter -1. To avoid the potential problem 
arising  from  the  relationship  between  delisting  firms  and  analyst  decision  to  drop  the 
coverage of such firms, we exclude all recommendations of firms delisted within event-
quarter +1. Again, we pay particular attention to the potential problems arising from the 
use of independent variables highly correlated. 
 
3.2.  Recommendation categories 
Working  exclusively  with  recommendations  readily  obtained  from  the  I/B/E/S 
database ignores analyst opinions when no recommendations are available for a specific 
time period. There are two reasons for a missing recommendation: 1) the analyst did not 
issue a recommendation or 2) the analyst decided to cease coverage of the company. These 
reasons are fundamentally different and have distinct interpretations. Therefore, we use 
three recommendation categories to mitigate this problem: a) reported recommendations; 
b) current recommendations; c) inferred recommendations. 
Reported  recommendations  are  those  effectively  issued  by  the  analyst  and  are 
readily  available  on  the  I/B/E/S  Recommendations  –  Detail  File.  We  define  analyst  i 
reported  recommendation  for  firm  j  at  event-quarter  q  (REPRECi,j,q)  as:  1)  the  last 
recommendation issued by analyst i within event-quarter q, if he/she does not drop the 
coverage of firm j after the last recommendation date; 2) no recommendation, if analyst i 
does not issue a new recommendation within event-quarter q or if analyst i decides to drop 
the coverage of firm j after the last recommendation date within event-quarter q.
13 The 
reported recommendation for firm  j at event-quarter q (REPRECj,q) is then calculated as 
the  simple  average  of  analyst  reported  recommendations  for  firm  j  at  event-quarter  q. 
Finally, we define firms’ average reported recommendations at quarter q as follows: 
                                                           
13 The date on which a particular analyst stopped coverage for a particular firm is taken from the I/B/E/S Recommendations – 












where M is the number of firms with available reported recommendations in event-
quarter q. 
 
Current recommendations are similar to reported recommendations but with a major 
difference.  In  particular, for those  cases  where  a  missing  recommendation  for  a  given 
event-quarter is not due to the analyst decision to drop coverage, we assume that the last 
reported recommendation still applies to the current event-quarter. Specifically, we define 
analyst i’s current recommendation for firm j at event-quarter q (CURRECi,j,q) as: 1) the 
last reported recommendation issued by analyst i if he/she does not decide to drop the 
coverage of firm j after the last recommendation date; 2) no recommendation, if analyst i 
decides to drop the coverage of firm j after the last recommendation date. The current 
recommendation  for  firm  j  at  event-quarter  q  (CURRECj,q)  is  then  calculated  as  the 
average  of  analyst  current  recommendations  for  firm  j  at  event-quarter  q.  Finally,  we 












where M is the number of firms with available current recommendations at event-
quarter q. 
 
Inferred  recommendations  are  similar  to  current  recommendations  with  one 
difference.  When  an  analyst  ceases  coverage  of  a  firm,  we  infer  an  unfavourable 
recommendation for that event-quarter and for the subsequent two event-quarters.
14 This 
aims at capturing the association between analyst decision to cease coverage of a firm and 
analyst  negative  expectations  about  the  firm’s  future  prospects  as  discussed in  section 
3.1.1. Drawing on Clarke et al. (2006), we define analyst i’s inferred recommendation for 
                                                           
14 We limit the inferring of the unfavourable recommendation to the two event-quarters following coverage cease given the 
evidence that the impact of a recommendation change may last 6-month (Womack, 1996). - 18 - 
firm j at event-quarter q (INFRECi,j,q) as: 1) the last current recommendation issued by 
analyst  i  if  he/she  does  not  decide  to  drop  the  coverage  of  firm  j  after  the  last 
recommendation date; 2) an “underperform” recommendation if analyst i decides to drop 
the coverage of firm j within event-quarter q or the last two event-quarters and if the last 
recommendation issued by the analyst prior to coverage cessation is a “strong buy” or a 
“buy”; 3) a “sell” recommendation if analyst i decides to drop the coverage of firm j within 
event-quarter q or the last two event-quarters and if the last recommendation issued by the 
analyst  prior  to  the  coverage  cessation  is  a  “hold”,  “underperform”  or  “sell”;  4)  no 
recommendation, if analyst i decided to drop the coverage of firm j for more than two 
event-quarters. The inferred recommendation for firm j at event-quarter q (INFRECj,q) is 
then calculated as the average of analyst inferred recommendations for firm j at event-













where M is the number of firms with available inferred recommendations at event-
quarter q. 
 
4. Main results 
4.1.  Analyst anticipation of the GCM audit report 
Table 5 summarizes our results testing analyst anticipation of the GCM audit report 
by comparing stock recommendations for GCM firms and control firms over the period 
preceding the bad news disclosure. We find no significant differences between mean and 
median stock recommendations for GCM and non-GCM firms from event-quarter -8 to 
event-quarter -5. In addition, the difference between the percentage of sample and control 
firms for which the average recommendation is classified as “buy” is not significant at 
conventional levels. Importantly, these findings are consistent across all three different 
recommendation categories. These results suggest that analysts are advising investors to 
buy  both  GCM  and  control  firm  stocks  in  the  most  distant  event-quarters,  a  fact 
emphasised by the high percentage of firms for which the average recommendation is 
“buy” (above 60% for the large majority of quarters). As such, our results suggest that, - 19 - 
approximately two years before the event, analysts do not distinguish GCM from control 
firms and share similar expectations about both types of firms. 
The analysis of the most recent event-quarters reveals a different pattern. Table 5 
shows that, starting from event-quarter -4, the average stock recommendation for GCM 
firms becomes significantly more unfavourable than that of non-GCM firms. In general, 
analysts downgrade their stock recommendations for GCM firms from “buy” to “hold” 
while maintaining their previous recommendations for control firms. More importantly, in 
most  cases,  the  differences  in  the  mean  and  median  stock  recommendations  between 
groups are now statistically significant at the 0.1% level. Again, the results are materially 
the same for all three different recommendations under scrutiny. As an example, consider 
the  reported  recommendations  for  quarter  -1.  The  mean  (median)  recommendation  for 
GCM  firms  is  2.70  (3.00)  whereas  the  mean  (median)  recommendation  for  non-GCM 
firms is 1.90 (2.00), with these differences both significant at the 0.1% level. In addition, 
only 33% of GCM firms have their average recommendation classified as “buy” in contrast 
with the 75% for the control firms (difference significant at the 0.1% level).  
 
 




Table 6 reports the results from running the logistic regression model of equation 2 
to distinguish between firms for which analysts cease their coverage before the publication 
of the GCM audit report and those for which analysts continue their coverage. As can be 
seen,  our  logistic  regression  model  is  highly  significant  (Wald  x
2  =  107.11,  p-
value<0.0001)  and  reveals  that  the  going-concern  modified  group  (GCMG)  variable 
coefficient is positive and highly significant. This suggests that, ceteris paribus, analysts 
are more prone to cease coverage of GCM firms than control firms between the event-
quarter -4 and event-quarter -1. We also find three significant independent variables, with 
all coefficients consistent with our initial predictions. For instance, LOGSIZE is negatively 
related to the analyst to stop firm coverage. This indicates that analysts are relatively more 
prone to cease coverage of small firms, consistent with previous research showing that 
analyst coverage is strongly related to firms’ size (e.g., Bhushan, 1989; Hong, Lim, and 
Stein, 2000). Moreover, the coefficients of BM and MOM suggest that analyst decision to 
cease coverage of firms is facilitated in the case of value firms and firms with negative - 20 - 
momentum, reinforcing the notion that analyst prefer growth stocks and stocks associated 
with  positive  momentum  (Jegadeesh  et  al.,  2004).  Importantly,  we  find  that  these 
conclusions are robust when we re-estimate the model excluding the independent variables 
that are more correlated with the significant ones. In addition, the sign and significance of 
these coefficients does not change when we use the stepwise technique to estimate the 
logistic regression model. 
Overall, these results suggest that security analysts recognise and signal the going-
concern problems of firms as the GCM date approaches by communicating unfavourable 
information to the market. First, they downgrade stock recommendations for GCM firms 
more aggressively than the recommendations for control firms. Second, analysts are more 
likely  to cease the  coverage  of  GCM  firms  in comparison to  non-GCM  firms  sharing 
similar size and BM ratio over the one-year period before the GCM date. 
 
 




4.2.  Analyst reaction to the GCM audit report 
Table 7 summarizes our results testing analyst reaction to the publication of a GCM 
audit report by comparing stock recommendations for GCM firms between event-quarter -
1  and  event-quarter  +1.  Panel  A  (panel  B)  presents  the  results  for  reported  (current) 
recommendations, whereas panel C shows the results when inferred recommendations are 
considered.  As  can  be  seen,  there  is  no  statistically  significant  difference  in  analyst 
recommendations following the publication of a GCM audit report. For instance, the mean 
(median) reported recommendation in event-quarter -1 is 2.70 (3.00) and 2.68 (3.00) in 
event-quarter +1, with no significant differences between them. In addition, we find that, 
generally,  the  differences  between  current  and  inferred  recommendations  from  event-
quarter -1 to event-quarter +1 are not significant at conventional levels. This suggests that 
analysts do not react to the publication of a GCM audit report by changing their stock 
recommendations of firms for which their auditors disclose a going-concern modified audit 
report for the first-time following the disclosure date.  
 - 21 - 
 
Table 7 here 
 
 
Table 8 shows the results from running the logistic regression model 4 to distinguish 
between firms for which analysts cease their coverage following the publication of a GCM 
audit report and those for which analysts continue their coverage. The key finding in this 
table relates to the positive and highly significant coefficient associated with the GCMG 
variable (p<0.0001) suggesting that analysts are more prone to cease coverage of GCM 
firms than control firms within the first event-quarter following the disclosure of a GCM 
audit report. Importantly, our logistic regression model is highly significant (Wald x
2 = 
97.87, p-value<0.0001). We also find an additional significant independent variable in our 
model. Interpreting the negative and significant coefficient associated with MOM suggests 
that,  ceteris  paribus,  the  analyst’s  decision  to  cease  coverage  of  a  firm  following  the 
disclosure of a GCM audit report is strengthened when firms have negative momentum. 
Similar  to  the  robustness  analysis  conducted  in  section  4.1.,  we  confirm  that  the 
conclusions  when  interpreting  regression  4  results  are  materially  the  same  when  we 
exclude the independent variables that are more correlated with the significant ones as well 
as when we use the stepwise technique to estimate the logistic regression model. 
Overall, our results suggest that security analysts do not ignore the publication of a 
GCM audit report. However, they do not communicate unfavourable information to the 
market through a downgrade in stock recommendation following the GCM announcement 
but prefer to cease coverage of GCM firms. This avoids the need to report negatively on 
them. Such a result is consistent with the idea that analysts dislike issuing unfavourable 
recommendations (e.g., McNichols and O’Brien, 1997) and that a coverage cessation is 
likely to be associated with unfavourable information about the future prospects of the firm 
(e.g., McNichols and O’Brien, 1997; Griffin, 2003; Clarke et al., 2006). 
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5. Additional tests 
5.1.  Controlling for alternative benchmarks 
This  section  aims  at  ensuring  that  our  prior  results  are  not  due  to  analysts’ 
preferences for certain stocks nor are they a mere statistical artefact. In effect, analyst 
behaviour  regarding  GCM  stock  recommendations  might  be  related  to  other  firm 
characteristics than size and the BM ratio, that also have the ability to predict returns (e.g., 
Fama and French, 1992; Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Dichev, 1998). As we show in table 
3, GCM firms have significant higher levels of financial distress and worse past return 
performance.  Therefore,  particular  emphasis  will  be  given  to  the  robustness  of  our 
conclusions using alternative sets of control firms that account for these characteristics. 
Size is used as a match criterion in all benchmarks given its relationship with both future 
stock returns and level of analyst coverage. 
 
5.1.1.   Matching on size and momentum 
Prior stock performance is described as an important predictor of future returns. For 
instance, De Bondt and Thaler (1985; 1987) find that portfolios of past losers outperform 
past winners over the subsequent 3- to 5-years. In addition, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993; 
2001) find that firms with higher (lower) short-term price momentum earn higher (lower) 
returns over the subsequent 12 months. Importantly, Jegadeesh et al. (2004) find a positive 
association  between  analysts’  recommendations  and  stock  momentum,  suggesting  that 
analysts are aware of this relationship. 
To  investigate  if  the  more  aggressive  downgrade  of  stock  recommendations  for 
GCM firms as the GCM date approaches as well as the higher likelihood of coverage 
cessation before and after the GGM event is related to firms’ momentum, we identify a 
new set of control firms by matching each of our sample firms with the firm with most 
similar size and momentum. Control firms are identified as follows. First, for each sample 
firm, we identify all non-financial, non-utility and non-GCM firms listed on the NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ at the GCM announcement date. Sample and match candidate size 
is defined as market capitalization (shares outstanding times price) at one year before the 
GCM announcement.
15 Subsequently, among the match candidates for each sample firm, 
we identify those with a market value between 70% and 130% of the sample firm. Finally, 
                                                           
15 We also measure the market value for sample and control firms six and one month before the GCM announcement date to 
ensure the robustness of the reported results. Results are materially the same. - 23 - 
from this list of candidates, we choose a control firm with the closest momentum to that of 
the GCM firm. Momentum is defined as in section 3.1.1. 
We find that our previous conclusions do not change substantially when we use this 
matching criterion to define an alternative set of control firms. First, we find significant 
differences in all categories of analyst stock recommendations between GCM and control 
firms at event-quarter -1. For instance, the mean (median) inferred recommendation for 
GCM  firms  for  event-quarter  -1  is  3.09  (3.21)  whilst  the  mean  (median)  inferred 
recommendation for control firms is 2.86 (3.00), with these differences significant at the 
1% and 0.1% level respectively. In addition, only 22% of GCM firms have their average 
inferred  recommendation  classified  as  “buy”  in  contrast  with  30%  for  control  firms 
(difference significant at the 1% level). However, it should be noted that these differences 
become significant only after event-quarter -3 and the significance of these differences is 
now weaker (usually at a 5% level). These results are consistent with those of Jegadeesh et 
al.  (2004)  who  show  that  analysts  have  a  predisposition  to  rate  more  unfavourably 
companies with negative momentum. As such, although analysts also downgrade stock 
recommendations for firms with lower momentum, their downgrade is more aggressive for 
GCM firms than control firms with similar size and momentum. Second, the results from 
running logistic regressions 2 and 4 using this new set of control firms does not change the 
conclusion that analysts are more prone to cease coverage of GCM firms than control firms 
before and after the publication of a GCM audit report.  
 
5.1.2.  Matching on industry, size and BM 
Industry affiliation is also perceived as a characteristic that might explain returns 
(e.g., Lyon, Barber, and Tsai, 1999). To mitigate the potential problem arising from the 
association between industry affiliation and analyst recommendations, we identify a new 
set of control firms by matching each of our sample firms with firms of the same industry. 
More specifically, for each sample firm, we identify all non-financial, non-utility and non-
GCM firms listed in on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ at the GCM announcement date 
with the same two-digit SIC code. Next, among these companies, we identify those with a 
market value between 70% and 130% of the market value of the sample firm. Once again, 
sample and match candidate size is defined as market capitalization (shares outstanding 
times  price)  one  year  before  the  GCM  announcement  date.
16  Finally,  from this list of 
                                                           
16 We also measure the market value for sample and control firms six and one month before the GCM announcement date to 
ensure the robustness of the reported results. Results are materially the same. - 24 - 
candidates, we choose as a control firm the firm which has the closest BM ratio to that of 
our GCM firm. The BM ratio is defined as in section 2.2. 
Our results show that analyst anticipation of a GCM audit report and their reaction 
to this event is not driven by an industry bias. In fact, the more aggressive downgrade of 
recommendations for GCM stock recommendations than for control firms remains clear 
using this new set of control firms. We find that stock recommendations for GCM firms 
become significantly more unfavourable than non-GCM firms after event-quarter -5. At a 
more detailed level, mean and median differences between stock recommendations for 
GCM and control firms as well as the differences in the percentage of firms for which their 
average recommendation is classified as “buy” are highly significant at the 0.1% level for 
all recommendation categories for event-quarter -2 and -1. In addition, the coefficients 
associated with the GCMG variable remain positive and highly significant when we run 
regression 2 and 4 with a set of control firms that account for industry. 
 
5.1.3.  Matching on size and distress risk 
Existing research suggests that highly distressed firms tend to underperform less 
distressed firms (e.g., Dichev, 1998; Griffin and Lemmon, 2002). As such, analysts may be 
more prone to downgrade their recommendation for firms with high distress risk, a fact 
that  is  particularly  important  for  our  research  since  GCM  firms  are  highly  financially 
distressed as can be seen in table 2.
17 
To investigate if our previous conclusions are due to the omission of a distress risk 
factor in the set of control firms, we  identify a new set of firms by matching each of our  
sample firms with the firm with most similar size and z-score. Control firms are identified 
as follows. First, for each sample firm, we identify all non-financial, non-utility and non-
GCM firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ at the GCM announcement date. 
Sample and match candidate size is defined as market capitalization (shares outstanding 
times price) one year before the GCM announcement.
18 Subsequently, among the match 
candidates for each sample firm, we identify those with a market value between 70% and 
130% of the sample firm. Finally,  from this list of candidates, we  choose a control firm 
with the closest z-score to that of each GCM sample firm. The z -score is used as a proxy 
for  distress  risk  and  is  computed  following  Altman’s  (1968)  model.  The  accounting 
                                                           
17 In particular, it shows that mean (median) Altman z-score is 1.15 (0.93). Moreover, Altman (1968) suggests that firm for 
which z-score is inferior to 1.8 clearly fall into the bankruptcy category. 
18 We also measure the market value for sample and control firms six and one month before the GCM announcement date to 
ensure the robustness of reported results. Results are materially the same. - 25 - 
information from the fiscal year ending one year before the GCM announcement date is 
employed to compute each firm’s z-score. 
Our results confirm that analysts anticipate the publication of a GCM audit report by 
downgrading more aggressively their recommendations for GCM firms than control firms 
as the GCM date approaches. In fact, analyst recommendation trend for control firms is 
very similar to that presented in table 5 using size and BM ratio as matching criteria. For 
instance, the mean (median) inferred recommendation for control firms in event-quarter -1 
now is 2.55 (2.48) whereas the percentage of control firms for which their average inferred 
recommendation is classified as “buy” is 50%. Importantly, all differences between GCM 
and control firm recommendations become significant at conventional levels after event-
quarter -4 and highly significant at the 0.1% level at event-quarter -2 and -1. Again, our 
results show that analysts are more prone to cease coverage of GCM firms than control 
firms before and after the publication of a GCM audit report. 
 
6. Discussion 
This  study  contributes  to  understand  how  analysts  deal  with  the  going-concern 
assumption and whether investors should be aware of analyst behavior in this particular 
domain.  For  instance,  our  results  provide  further  evidence  that  analysts  are  able  to 
anticipate non-routine bad news events (e.g., Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1996; Clarke 
et al., 2006; Cotter and Young, 2007) through their relative pessimism about GCM firms 
and their decision to cease coverage of such firms. Moreover, we show that analysts react 
to  the  publication  of  a  GCM  audit report  by  ceasing  firm  coverage  thereby  providing 
further evidence that these sophisticated agents are less interested in following companies 
associated with bad news (e.g., Griffin, 2003), presumably tending to replace these firms 
with others more associated with good news (e.g., McNichols and O’Brien, 1997; Kecskés 
and Womack, 2007). At a more detailed level, our result that analysts are more likely to 
cease coverage of value GCM firms and GCM firms with negative momentum, provides 
evidence  that  analyst preference for  growth stocks and  stocks associated  with  positive 
momentum (Jegadeesh et al., 2004) is also demonstrated in the bad news domain. 
However,  despite  the  evidence  that  security  analysts  anticipate  and  react  to  this 
accounting  event,  we  conclude  that  the  signals  they  use  to  communicate  unfavorable 
information are not understood by retail investors, who constitute the main clientele for 
GCM  stocks.  Our  results  demonstrate  that  analysts  downgrade  their  stock 
recommendations for GCM firms from “buy” to “hold” while maintaining their previous - 26 - 
“buy”  recommendations  for  similar  non-GCM  firms  as  the  event  date  approaches. 
Malmendier  and  Shanthikumar  (2007)  show  that  retail  investors  follow  analyst  stock 
recommendations literally and that, contrary to large investors, they do not react negatively 
to a “hold” recommendation. These authors conclude that retail investors react negatively 
only  when  analysts say  “underperform”  or  “sell”, which is  not  the  case in  the  going-
concern  domain.  In  line  with  this  rationale,  Kausar,  Taffler  and  Tan  (2010)  show  a 
significant decline of mean institutional holdings on GC stocks from 17% to 11% within 
the same period whereas retail investors increase their holdings from 69% to 74%. As 
such,  analyst  recommendations  for  GCM  firms  are  not  providing  retail  investors  with 
value-relevant information before the publication of such bad news and explain, at least 
partially, why retail investors reinforce their holdings in these highly distressed stocks. 
Consistent with the notion that security analysts are reluctant to issue unfavourable 
recommendations (e.g., McNichols and O’Brien, 1997; Conrad et al., 2006), we conjecture 
that  analyst  coverage  cessation  explains,  at  least  partially,  why  the  average 
recommendation on GCM stocks does not reduce from “hold”. In fact, the analyst decision 
to cease coverage of firms with going-concern problems has important implications in the 
interpretation of the observable average recommendation for GCM firms. Considering that 
analysts do not downgrade stock recommendations when they cease coverage of firms 
(e.g., McNichols and O’Brien, 1997), the lower tail of the recommendation distribution is 
censored leading to the average observed recommendation being more favourable than the 
true unobservable average recommendation. This rationale sheds light on the words of 
Shefrin (2002), who state that analysts “do not always mean what they say. (…) They 
frequently say „hold‟ but mean „sell‟, or say „buy‟ when they mean „hold‟.” 
Our results can be better understood by drawing a distinction between pessimism 
and relative pessimism. In the sense of McNichols and O’Brien (1997), relative pessimism 
is a view that is unfavourable relative to a benchmark, such as in the case of an analyst 
rating a particular stock worse than another stock. Therefore, relative pessimism is an 
excellent definition to summarise our findings on analyst expectations for a GCM firm. 
However, we reject the idea that analysts are pessimistic about the future prospects of 
GCM firms within the pre-event period. Pessimism can be described as a “view that was 
too unfavourable in retrospect” (McNichols and O’Brien, 1997). As such, does a “hold” 
recommendation represents a pessimistic view about the future prospects of GCM firms 
immediately before the disclosure of such a bad news? On the contrary, there are reasons 
to believe that a “hold” recommendation in this context may represent an optimistic view. 
Typically, brokerage firms (e.g., Credit Suisse, UBS Warburg, Salomon Smith Barney, 
Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch) issue a “hold” recommendation when a stock is perceived - 27 - 
to be fairly priced. However, Kausar, Taffler, and Tan (2009) show that, following the 
publication of a GCM audit report, stock prices of GCM firms underperform by around -
14% over the next year.  
 
7. Conclusion 
Using a sample of 924 non-finance, non-utility, industry firms with first-time going-
concern modified audit reports published between1994 and 2005, we show that security 
analysts anticipate the publication of a GCM audit report. To be  precice, we find that 
analysts downgrade more aggressively GCM stock recommendations than control firms 
and are more likely to cease coverage of GCM firms over the one-year period prior to the 
GCM event. We also demonstrate that analysts react to the publication of a GCM audit 
report but by being more likely to cease coverage of GCM firms compared with similar 
non-GCM firms immediately after the disclosure event, not by downgrading their stock 
recommendations. Importantly, we show that our results are robust to the use of alternative 
control firms based on size, BM ratio, momentum, industry and distress risk and to the use 
of different categories of recommendations. 
Overall,  despite  the  idea  that  the  marginal  contribution  of  security  analysts  to 
investors may be greater in the case of the dissemination of bad news (e.g., Hong, Lim, and 
Stein, 2000), investors cannot rely on these sophisticated agents as messengers of bad 
news.  In  particular,  investors  should  be  aware  that  analysts  are  reluctant  to  report 
negatively on firms, and that the observable recommendations for firms experiencing bad 
news  do  not  tell  the  all  story  as  the  SEC  highlight  in  their  statement  about  analyst 
recommendations. Our results suggest the need for investors to read between the lines and 
pay particular attention to analyst relative pessimism about stocks and to their decision to 
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Table 1 
 
Sample Selection Process for the First-Time GCM Audit Report 
 
This  table  shows  how  our  population  of  924  non-finance,  non-utility  industry  firms  listed  on  the  NYSE,  AMEX  or 
NASDAQ, for which the auditors disclosed a going-concern modified audit report for the first-time between 01.01.1994 and 
31.12.2005 is derived. 
The sample is obtained by using the 10k Wizard free search tool facility. The combination of keywords used for identifying 
our GCM cases is “raise substantial doubt” and “ability to continue as a going-concern”. Conditional on a firm having data in 
the CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged database, we manually verify if the company has a GCM audit report in that fiscal year and 
if the previous fiscal year is clean in order to identify the first-time GCM companies. We then exclude all cases that filed 
Chapter 11 before the audit report publication date, all cases classified as development stage enterprise, foreign, utilities or 
financials, and cases with insufficient CRSP/COMPUSTAT data. 
 
N
Firm-year observations identified through 10k wizard 29.102
Firm-year observations not found in CRSP/Compustat merged -16.866
Firm-year observations that do not constitute First-time GCM -9.940
Firm-year observations with insufficient CRSP/COMPUSTAT data -1.017
Firm-year observations classified as utilities or financials -142
Firm-year observations classified as foreign -56
Firm-year observations classified as development stage enterprise -112
Firm-year observations filing Chapter 11 before audit report publication date -45
















This table presents the descriptive statistics of our sample of 924 non-finance, non-utility industry firms listed on the NYSE, 
AMEX or NASDAQ, for which the auditors disclosed a going-concern modified audit report for the first-time between 
01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005. 
 
 
Panel A: Annual Distribution of the GCM cases 
 















Panel B: Continuous Variables 
 
Variable Mean Median St. Deviation
SIZE 89.57 33.66 167.08
SALES 103.68 21.55 227.20
TA 120.68 25.34 283.01
ROA -0.63 -0.37 0.76
CR 1.72 1.16 1.71
LEV 0.38 0.32 0.31
ZSCORE 1.15 0.93 1.10
PREDGC 0.20 0.01 2.84
BM 0.77 0.40 1.23
MOM -0.04 -0.04 0.07
 
SIZE = market value of equity measured by market capitalization in $ million; SALES = sales in $ million; TA = total assets 
in $ million; ROA=return on assets (net income/total assets); CR = current ratio (current assets/current liabilities); LEV=total 
debt/total assets; ZSCORE=financial distress measure computed as Altman (1968); PREDGC=probability of a forthcoming 
GCM audit report disclosure computed as Mutchler (1985). All variables are computed with data taken from the last annual 
financial accounts reported before the GCM date. BM= book value of equity divided by market capitalization, where book 
value of equity is taken from the last annual accounts reported prior to the date used to calculate the market capitalization at 
one year before the GCM announcement date; MOM = momentum, defined as the monthly average of prior 11 months (t-12 
to t-2) raw returns.  
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Panel C: Other characteristics 
 

















EQUITY = book value of equity dummy (1 if positive, 0 othewise); EPS = earnings per share dummy (1 if positive EPS, 0 
othewise); DIVID = dividend paid (1 if dividend paid, 0 othewise). All variables are computed with data taken from the last 
annual financial accounts reported before the GCM date. 
DEAD = bankruptcy dummy (1 if the firm enters into Chapter 7, Chapter 11, voluntary liquidation or is wound up within one 
year of the audit report date, 0 otherwise); DELIST = delist dummy (1 if the firm is delisted due to any reason within one 
year of the audit report date, 0 otherwise); AUDITOR = audit quality proxy dummy (1 if BIG5, 0 otherwise); GCMW = 
going-concern withdrawn dummy (1 if the firm receives a non-GCM opinion within one year, 0 otherwise). 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics – Sample Firms vs. Control Firms 
 
This table compares the descriptive statistics for our sample and control firms. Control firms are selected employing the control firm approach based on size and BM as described in section 2.2. The last four columns 
report the mean and median differences between the variables of each portfolio. The significance of the t-test (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) is showed in brackets on the right of the mean (median) differences. 
 
Mean Median St. Deviation Mean Median St. Deviation
SIZE 89.57 33.66 167.08 90.88 33.62 184.36 -1.31 (0.8727) 0.04 (0.6924)
SALES 103.68 21.55 227.20 144.14 30.58 330.11 -40.46 (0.0022) -9.03 (<0.0001)
TA 120.68 25.34 283.01 119.74 30.65 255.18 0.94 (0.9404) -5.31 (0.0095)
ROA -0.63 -0.37 0.76 -0.17 -0.01 0.43 -0.46 (<0.0001) -0.36 (<0.0001)
CR 1.72 1.16 1.71 3.07 2.07 3.33 -1.35 (<0.0001) -0.91 (<0.0001)
LEV 0.38 0.32 0.31 0.28 0.22 0.25 0.10 (<0.0001) 0.10 (<0.0001)
ZSCORE 1.15 0.93 1.10 1.52 1.22 1.46 -0.37 (<0.0001) -0.29 (<0.0001)
PREDGC 0.20 0.01 2.84 2.08 0.57 6.76 -1.88 (<0.0001) -0.56 (<0.0001)
BM 0.77 0.40 1.23 0.77 0.40 1.14 0.00 (0.9825) 0.00 (0.8670)
MOM -0.04 -0.04 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.07 -0.06 (<0.0001) -0.05 (<0.0001)
Variable
GCM FIRMS CONTROL FIRMS







SIZE = market value of equity measured by market capitalization in $ million; SALES = sales in $ million; TA = total assets in $ million; ROA=return on assets (net income/total assets); CR = current ratio (current 
assets/current liabilities); LEV=total debt/total assets; ZSCORE=financial distress measure computed as Altman (1968); PREDGC=probability of a forthcoming GCM audit report disclosure computed as Mutchler 
(1985). All variables are computed with data taken from the last annual financial accounts reported before the GCM date. BM= book value of equity divided by market capitalization, where book value of equity is taken 
from the last annual accounts reported prior to the date used to calculate the market capitalization at one year before the GCM announcement date; MOM = momentum, defined as the monthly average of prior 11 
months (t-12 to t-2) raw returns. - 37 - 
TABLE 4 
Pearson and Spearman correlations between Independent Variables 
 
This table provides the Pearson (Spearman rank) correlation above (below) the diagonal between all independent variables used 
to estimate equations 2 and 4 for both GCM and control firms receiving stock recommendations before the GCM date. The two-
tailed p-value is provided in parenthesis below the correlation. GCM companies are our sample of 924 non-finance, non-utility 
industry firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, for which their auditors disclose a going-concern modified audit report 
for the first-time between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005. Control firms are selected employing the control firm approach based on 
size  and  BM  as  described  in  section  2.2.Dummy  variable  GCMG=1  if  the  company  receives  a  GCM  audit  report,  and  0 
otherwise;  LOGSIZE=natural  log  of  market  capitalization  measured  one  year  before  the  GCM  announcement  date; 
ANALY=number of analysts following the firm in quarter -4; BM= book value of equity divided by market capitalization, where 
book value of equity is taken from the last annual accounts reported prior to the date used to calculate the market capitalization at 
one year before the GCM announcement date; MOM=monthly average of prior 11 month (t-12 to t-2) raw returns; ROA=return 
on  assets  (net income/total assets); CR=current  ratio  (current assets/current  liabilities);  ZSCORE=financial distress  measure 
computed as Altman (1968); PREDGC=probability of a forthcoming GCM audit report disclosure computed as Mutchler (1985); 
LEV=total debt/total assets. All variables are computed with data taken from the last annual financial accounts reported before 






































GCMG LOGSIZE ANALY BM MOM ROA ZSCORE PREDGC LEV
GCMG 0.015 0.062 0.079 -0.547 -0.253 -0.192 -0.067 0.168
(0.4387) (0.0019) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0007) (<0.0001)
LOGSIZE 0.020 0.563 -0.251 -0.229 0.092 0.038 0.054 0.143
(0.3213) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0536) (0.0064) (<0.0001)
ANALY 0.063 0.606 -0.030 -0.118 -0.074 -0.047 0.066 0.168
(0.0015) (<0.0001) (0.1313) (<0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0194) (0.0010) (<0.0001)
BM 0.099 -0.334 -0.016 0.037 -0.161 -0.046 -0.000 -0.151
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.4334) (0.064) (<0.0001) (0.0221) (0.9995) (<0.0001)
MOM -0.588 -0.162 -0.098 -0.055 0.179 0.207 0.037 -0.147
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0062) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0160) (<0.0001)
ROA -0.509 0.190 0.063 -0.077 0.392 0.040 -0.054 0.080
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0015) (0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0472) (0.0070) (<0.0001)
ZSCORE -0.305 -0.036 -0.059 -0.009 0.323 0.365 0.521 -0.186
(<0.0001) (0.0731) (0.0320) (0.6620) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
PREDGC -0.374 -0.025 -0.041 0.121 0.237 0.361 0.470 -0.153
(<0.0001) (0.2027) (0.0403) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
LEV 0.196 0.109 0.105 -0.080 -0.161 0.031 -0.383 -0.746
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.1168) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)- 38 - 
TABLE 5 
Quarterly Trend in Analyst stock Recommendations – Sample Firms vs. Control Firms 
 
This table presents the event-quarter trend in analyst stock recommendations from event-quarter -8 to event-quarter -1 for our population of 924 non-finance, non-utility industry firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX 
or NASDAQ, for which their auditors disclose a going-concern modified audit report for the first-time between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005 and for control firms. Control firms are selected employing the control 
firm approach based on size and BM as described in section 2.2. 
Section  3.2.  provides  detailed  explanation  about  the  estimation  of  the  recommendation  categories.  Event-quarters  are  defined  as  a  period  of  90  calendar  days  relative  to  the  GCM  announcement  date. 
Recommendations are coded as 1 (strong buy), 2 (buy), 3 (hold), 4 (underperform) and 5 (sell). The percentage of “buy” recommendations is computed as the number of firms whose average recommendation is 
classified as a “buy” divided by the total number of firms with available recommendations. Specifically, firms are classified as “buy” if the average numerical recommendation is below 2.5. For each event-quarter, 
the “N” column indicates the number of firms with available recommendations. The last two columns in each recommendation category indicate the difference between the mean and median recommendation and 
percentage  of  “buy”  recommendations  as  well  as  its  significance.  In  particular,  the  two-tailed  significance  of  the  t-test  (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney  test)  is  reported  in  parentheses  for  the  mean  (median) 
recommendation difference, whereas the significance of the binomial test is used for the difference between the percentages of “buy” recommendations. 
 
 



















Mean 1.99 2.04 -0.05 (0.5510) 2.05 2.04 0.01 (0.7554) 2.05 2.04 0.01 (0.7554)
Median 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.5222) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.6466) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.6466)
% Buy 0.69 0.71 -0.02 (0.6164) 0.69 0.69 0.00 (0.9633) 0.69 0.69 0.00 (0.9633)
Mean 2.16 2.07 0.09 (0.2554) 2.09 2.05 0.04 (0.4546) 2.22 2.23 -0.01 (0.8804)
Median 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.5365) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.9667) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.5562)
% Buy 0.64 0.65 -0.01 (0.8923) 0.68 0.68 0.00 (0.8309) 0.62 0.60 0.02 (0.2991)
Mean 2.09 2.11 -0.02 (0.7462) 2.10 2.07 0.03 (0.5822) 2.39 2.39 0.00 (0.9612)
Median 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.7610) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.9499) 2.33 2.33 0.00 (0.7751)
% Buy 0.67 0.61 0.06 (0.1287) 0.67 0.67 0.00 (0.8387) 0.54 0.53 0.01 (0.7649)
Mean 2.20 2.06 0.14 (0.7852) 2.15 2.07 0.08 (0.1551) 2.57 2.52 0.05 (0.4059)
Median 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.0801) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.2096) 2.50 2.50 0.00 (0.4327)
% Buy 0.61 0.69 -0.08 (0.0165) 0.64 0.68 -0.04 (0.1056) 0.46 0.46 0.00 (0.9423)
Mean 2.32 2.00 0.32 (0.0001) 2.20 2.05 0.15 (0.0061) 2.66 2.49 0.17 (0.0065)
Median 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.0004) 2.00 2.00 0.00 (0.0123) 2.67 2.50 0.17 (0.0063)
% Buy 0.55 0.70 -0.15 (<0.0001) 0.62 0.68 -0.06 (0.0166) 0.41 0.47 -0.06 (0.0037)
Mean 2.63 2.14 0.49 (<0.0001) 2.31 2.06 0.25 (0.0588) 2.81 2.52 0.29 (<0.0001)
Median 2.79 2.00 0.79 (<0.0001) 2.25 2.00 0.25 (<0.0001) 3.00 2.50 0.50 (<0.0001)
% Buy 0.39 0.68 -0.29 (<0.0001) 0.57 0.67 -0.10 (<0.0001) 0.34 0.45 -0.11 (<0.0001)
Mean 2.68 2.18 0.50 (<0.0001) 2.37 2.12 0.25 (<0.0001) 2.95 2.56 0.39 (<0.0001)
Median 3.00 2.00 1.00 (<0.0001) 2.40 2.00 0.40 (<0.0001) 3.00 2.50 0.50 (<0.0001)
% Buy 0.32 0.63 -0.31 (<0.0001) 0.51 0.63 -0.12 (<0.0001) 0.28 0.42 -0.14 (<0.0001)
Mean 2.70 1.90 0.80 (<0.0001) 2.44 2.03 0.41 (<0.0001) 3.09 2.56 0.53 (<0.0001)
Median 3.00 2.00 1.00 (<0.0001) 2.50 2.00 0.50 (<0.0001) 3.21 2.50 0.71 (<0.0001)
% Buy 0.33 0.75 -0.42 (<0.0001) 0.44 0.69 -0.25 (<0.0001) 0.22 0.45 -0.23 (<0.0001)
-1 118 173 353
377 460 417
380 446 431
-2 159 173 371
369 462 409
-3 158 165 391 369 464 414
-4 189 168 405
356 434 387
-5 194 153 407 357 458 402
-6 204 174 404





Current (CURRECq) Inferred (INFRECq)
-8 180 170 347 336 347 336
Reported (REPRECq) 
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TABLE 6 
Logistic Regression Model Estimating the Probability of Cessation of Analyst Coverage 
before the GCM announcement  
 
This table presents the results of a binary logistic regression model estimating the probability of cessation of analyst coverage of a 
firm from event-quarter -4 to event-quarter -1 using both GCM and control firms. GCM companies are our sample of 924 non-
finance, non-utility industry firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, for which their auditors disclose a going-concern 
modified audit report for the first-time between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005. Control firms are selected employing the control firm 
approach based on size and BM as described in section 2.2. 
The binary logistic regression model is defined in equation 2. The binary dependent variable (CEASE) assumes 1 if analyst i decides 
to drop the coverage of firm j between event-quarter -4 and event-quarter -1. Nine independent variables are employed to estimate 
equation 1: Dummy variable GCMG=1 if the company receives a GCM audit report, and 0 otherwise; LOGSIZE=natural log of 
market capitalization measured one year before the GCM announcement date; ANALY=number of analysts following the firm in 
quarter -4; BM= book value of equity divided by market capitalization, where book value of equity is taken from the last annual 
accounts reported prior to the date used to calculate the market capitalization at one year before the GCM announcement date; 
MOM=monthly average of prior 11 month (t-12 to t-2) raw returns; ROA=return on assets (net income/total assets); CR=current 
ratio (current assets/current liabilities); ZSCORE=financial distress measure computed as Altman (1968); PREDGC=probability of a 
forthcoming GCM audit report disclosure computed as Mutchler (1985); LEV=total debt/total assets. All variables are computed 
with data taken from the last annual financial accounts reported before the GCM date. 
 
 
Independent variable Expected sign Coefficient Wald p-value
Intercept N.A. -0.59 9.42 0.0021
GCMG + 0.41 14.94 0.0001
LOGSIZE - -0.08 4.42 0.0354
ANALY - -0.01 0.85 0.3554
BM + 0.09 9.91 0.0016
MOM - -1.81 7.79 0.0052
ROA - -0.09 3.73 0.0536
ZSCORE - -0.00 0.05 0.8154
PREDGC - -0.00 2.25 0.1340
LEV + 0.24 3.12 0.0685
 
Likelihood ratio x
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TABLE 7 
Analyst Recommendation around the GCM Audit Report - Sample Firms 
 
This table presents a comparison between quarter -1 and quarter +1 analyst stock recommendations for our sample of 924 non-
finance, non-utility industry firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, for which their auditors disclose a going-concern 
modified audit report for the first-time between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2005. 
Section 3.2. provides detailed explanation about the estimation of the recommendation categories. Event-quarters are defined as a 
period of 90 calendar days relative to the GCM announcement date. Recommendations are coded as 1 (strong buy), 2 (buy), 3 
(hold), 4 (underperform) and 5 (sell). The percentage of “buy” recommendations is computed as the number of firms with “buy” 
recommendations divided by the total number of firms with available recommendations. Specifically, “buy” recommendations are 
those with ratings below 2.5. For each quarter, the “N” column indicates the number of companies with available recommendations. 
The last two columns in each recommendation category indicate the difference between the mean and median recommendation and 
percentage of “buy” recommendations as well as their significance. In particular, the two-tailed significance of the t-test (Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test) is reported in parentheses for the mean (median) recommendation difference, whereas the binomial test is used 
to test for the significance in the differences between the percentages of “buy” recommendations. 
 
Panel A: Reported recommendation comparison 
Q-1 N Q+1 N Difference p-value
Mean 2.70 2.68 0.02 (0.8712)
Median 3.00 3.00 0.00 (0.7929)





Panel B: Current recommendations comparison 
Q-1 N Q+1 N Difference p-value
Mean 2.44 2.44 0.00 (0.9325)
Median 2.50 2.50 0.00 (0.8950)





Panel C: Inferred recommendations comparison 
Q-1 N Q+1 N Difference p-value
Mean 3.09 3.18 -0.09 (0.1766)
Median 3.21 3.43 -0.22 (0.0499)
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TABLE 8 
Logistic Regression Model Estimating the Probability of Cessation of Analyst Coverage after 
the GCM Announcement 
 
This table presents the results of a binary logistic regression model estimating the probability of cessation of analyst coverage of a 
firm from event-quarter -1 to event-quarter +1 using both GCM and control firms. The GCM companies are our population of 924 
non-finance, non-utility industry firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, for which their auditors disclose a going-concern 
modified audit report for the first-time between 01.01.1994. Control firms are selected employing the control firm approach based 
on size and BM as described in section 2.2. 
The binary regression model is defined in equation 3. The binary dependent variable (CEASE) assumes 1 if analyst i decides to drop 
the coverage of firm j from event-quarter -1 to event-quarter +1. Nine independent variables are employed to estimate equation 3: 
Dummy  variable  GCMG=1  if  the  company  receives  a  GCM  audit  report,  and 0  otherwise;  LOGSIZE=natural  log  of  market 
capitalization measured one year before the GCM announcement date; ANALY=number of analysts following the firm in quarter -
1; BM= book value of equity divided by market capitalization, where book value of equity is taken from the last annual accounts 
reported  prior  to  the  date  used  to  calculate  the  market  capitalization  at  one  year  before  the  GCM  announcement  date; 
MOM=monthly average of prior 11 month (t-12 to t-2) raw returns; ROA=return on assets (net income/total assets); CR=current 
ratio (current assets/current liabilities); ZSCORE=financial distress measure computed as Altman (1968); PREDGC=probability of a 
forthcoming GCM audit report disclosure computed as Mutchler (1985); LEV=total debt/total assets. All variables are computed 
with data taken from the last annual financial accounts reported before the GCM date. 
 
Independent variable Expected sign Coefficient Wald p-value
Intercept N.A. -2.37 55.52 <0.0001
GCMG + 0.91 29.65 <0.0001
LOGSIZE - -0.00 0.00 0.9488
ANALY - -0.02 0.70 0.4016
BM + 0.03 0.32 0.5687
MOM - -1.94 3.74 0.0531
ROA - -0.06 0.47 0.4945
ZSCORE - -0.03 0.67 0.4127
PREDGC - 0.00 0.02 0.8853
LEV + 0.21 1.17 0.2786
 
Likelihood ratio x
2 (d.f.=9) = 88.15 with p<0.0001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 